I. Introduction
In his famous book, The Economics of Welfare [6] , Pigou showed graphically that the third degree price discrimination does not change total output of a monopoly if the demand curves in two separate markets are linear. Later, Robinson [7] confirmed Pigou's proposition mathematically. Recently, Ekelund, Higgins and Smithson [2] , Mai and Shih [4] extended PigouRobinson's analysis to the hiring of labor by a monopsony. They showed that the wage discrimination doesn't change total employment of a monopsony if the supply curves of labor in two separate markets are linear, and that PigouRobinson's proposition applies to the input markets. However, their analysis is based on the traditional nonspatial setting in which transportation cost and location decision are insignificant and negligible. It would be interesting and important to investigate the effect of wage discrimination on employment in a spatial world.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of wage discrimination on total employment and plant location of a monopsony in the WeberMoses triangle. It will be shown that in the spatial economy the PigouRobinson proposition holds if the plant location is predetermined. However, if the plant location is a choice variable, the wage discrimination may change total employment even if the supply curves are linear. This indicates that location decision and transportation cost play an important role in the determination of wage discrimination on total employment.
II. The Basic Model
Our analysis is based on the wellknown WeberMoses triangular model with the following assumptions:
(a) A monopsonist employs a single input (labor) located at two separate markets, A and B, to produce a single output which is sold in a monopolistic market C. The WeberMoses triangle in Figure 1 (b) The production function is specified as: The price of output at the plant is the market price minus the cost of transporting one unit of output from the plant to the market, p rh (6) where p = p(q) = p[f(L)], and r is the constant transportation rate of output.
(e) The objective of the firm is to choose the profitmaximizing employment and location.
It is worth mentioning that the inclusion of distance and transportation rate constitutes the major point of departure from the nonspatial model.
To investigate the effect of wage discrimination on employment, according to Silberberg [8] and Mai and Shih [4] , we consider the case in which the discriminating monopsony is posited to maximize profits subject to a constraint that [w.sub.1] [w.sub.2] = k where k is a parameter. The advantage of this approach is that, via the comparative statics, we can see how total employment changes when k moves from zero to the optimal value. The Lagrangean for this problem is 
This completes the model which constitutes our basic framework.
III. Effects of Wage Discrimination
We are now in a position to examine the effects of wage discrimination. First, we examine the case in which the plant location is predetermined, i.e., [Theta] is constant. To derive the effect of wage discrimination on total employment, we totally differentiate (8) (10) k is in general ambiguous. In other words, the wage discrimination will move the plant location toward the labor market with higher wage rate, and may change total employment of a monopsony.
The effect of wage discrimination on employment is, perhaps, surprising. According to the PigouRobinson proposition, in the nonspatial economy total employment is unchanged by discrimination if the supply curves are linear. But the above result shows that the wage discrimination may change total employment in the spatial economy. The difference results are due to the location effect.
The location effect of wage discrimination on employment can be depicted more clearly by using the SMFCDMFC (simple monopsonist's marginal factor cost curve discriminating monopsonist's marginal factor cost curve) approach, [2; 3]. In Figure 2 
IV. Concluding Remarks
We have attempted to show how the introduction of space and location in the wage discrimination model may alter the wellestablished PigouRobinson proposition. Assume that two supply curves are linear. We have shown that if the plant location is predetermined, the wage discrimination will not change total employment of a monopsony. In this case, the PigouRobinson proposition holds. We have also shown that if the plant location is treated as a decision variable, the wage discrimination will move the plant location toward the labor market with higher wage rate, and may change employment of a monopsony. This indicates that the PigouRobinson proposition can not be applied to the spatial economy. The upshot of this analysis is that firm's location decision and transportation costs have important influence on the effect of wage discrimination on employment.
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1. For simplicity, as did Moses [5] , we assume that h is held constant. However, our basic results remain unaffected if h is a choice variable.
2. Following Weber [9] and Moses [5] , we assume that "inputs are sold f.o.b.", [5, 260] , i.e., the same wage at each source and the firm bears the transportation cost. In the ease where workers absorb the transportation cost, i.e., the c.i.f. pricing. The supply of labor can be specified as: 3. To verify this proposition, in the case of simple monopsony, we combine equations (2) and (3) 
